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Irrelevant Costs and Economic Realities:
Funding the IDEA after Cedar Rapids
ANDREW D.M. MILLER*
The Supreme Court in Cedar Rapids held that school districts must pay for
nursing services for students with disabilities, regardless of cost, under the
IDEA. The author argues that even though the purpose of Cedar Rapids is noble,
i.e., to ensure equal access to education for those with disabilities, underfunded
school districts will be enfeebled by the decision. Thus, the author concludes that
cost should once again be considered afactor under the IDEA in deciding which
resources schools should providefor disabled children. The author offers several
legislative solutions to take into account the economic reality that school districts
face: (1) defining medical services differently, (2) implementing spending caps,
(3) allowing an undue-hardship defense for school districts, and (4) financial
contributions by Congress to ease the expensive burden put on the school
districts by the Cedar Rapids decision.
I. INTRODUCTION
When Garret was four years old, his spinal column was severed in a
motorcycle accident thus rendering him paralyzed from the neck down.1 While
his mental capacities were unaffected,2 the accident left him in need of extensive
nursing services.3 In 1993, Garret's mother asked Garret's public school district
to assume the financial responsibility for the required health-care services during
the school day.4 The school officials balked. They claimed that the district was
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encouragement. This note is dedicated to the memory of Donald M. Miller.
I Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 69 (1999).
2 Id. Among other things, Garret is able to speak, operate his motorized wheelchair, and
operate a computer. His academic performance in regular classes has been described as "a
success." Id.
3 See id at 69-70 n.3. Garret is "ventilator dependent," which means that he can breathe
only with extemal assistance. Id. at 69 n.2. Due to his condition, Garret requires a responsible
person nearby that can attend to his needs while he is in school. Id. at 69. Among other things,
Garret needs urinary catheterization daily and suctioning of his tracheotomy tube typically
every six hours. Id at 69-70 n.3. He also needs to be put in a reclined position for five minutes
out of each hour. Id The need for one-on-one nursing care is especially important because
various emergencies, such as a malfunctioning ventilator or autonomic hyperreflexia (an
involuntary reaction to either anxiety or a full bladder), may arise during the school day. Id.
4 Id. at 70.
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not obligated to provide such extensive-and expensive-services.5  The
Supreme Court emphatically disagreed. 6
In Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret F.,7 the Supreme
Court held that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)8 requires
public school districts to provide ventilator-dependent students with all-day one-
on-one nursing care.9 The holding purportedly settled a long debate over whether
public school districts were responsible for the expensive nursing care required by
students with severe disabilities under the IDEA.10 However, in drawing its
conclusion, the Court surprised scholars by declaring that the cost of such services
is entirely irrelevant in any IDEA analysis. 1
When we consider the relevance of cost in any public school issue, we should
remember that "[m]illions of American children are... 'savaged' by the grossly
inferior education they receive." 12 There are public school districts in the United
States that manage broken-down facilities and must hold classes in bathrooms,
gymnasiums, hallways, and closets.13 Children are being subjected to soaring
class sizes because of the ever-shrindng number of teachers. 14 There is a high
school principal in East St. Louis that views fire damage as a "low priority" and
5 Id.
6 See infra Part II.C.
7 Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. 66.
8 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491o (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
9 See Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. at 79 ("[Tjhe District must fund [the] 'related services'
[requested by Garret] in order to help guarantee that students like Garret are integrated in the
public schools.").
10 See infra Part II.B.
11 In commentary preceding the Court's ruling, scholars speculated that cost would be
included as a factor for consideration. See Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Where Will the Supreme Court
Draw the Line between Medical and Health Services under the IDEA ?, 128 EDUC. L. RE'. 559,
569 (1998) [hereinafter Osborne, Draw the Line]("[T]he Supreme Court is likely to employ a
multifactor test similar to that used by the lower courts in decisions such as Destel [v. Bd of
Educ., 637 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D.N.Y. 1986)], and Neely [v. Rutherford County Schs., 68 F.3d
965 (6th Cir. 1995)]."); see also Tara L. Eyer, Comment, Greater Expectations: How the 1997
IDEA Amendments Raise the Basic Floor of Opportunity for Children with Disabilities, 103
DICK. L. REV. 613, 635 (1999) (predicting and lamenting that courts will be reluctant to impose
heavier financial burdens on public schools).
12 Michael A. Rebell, Fiscal Equity in Education: Deconstructing the Reigning Myths and
Facing Reality, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 691, 714 (1994-95). See generally
JONATHAN KozoI, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1991)
(discussing the poverty-stricken public school systems in East St. Louis, Illinois; the South Side
of Chicago, Illinois; New York, New York; Camden, New Jersey, and Washington, D.C.).
13 KOZOL, supra note 12, at 114.
14 Id. at 24-25.
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dreams of enough funds to replace windows and install a new heating system.15 It
is these school districts, ensnared in a mire of extremely limited funds and
unfulfilled necessities, that cannot fathom the Court's disregard of the costs
involved in the IDEA. These are the districts that will feel the pinch if they are
asked to provide extensive health-care services to a disabled student. While this
may appear to be an apocalyptic assessment of the situation created by the Court,
it is not altogether unreal. Further, extreme rules are best tested by their extreme
applications. Thus, a rule that requires a school district to provide anything
without regard to cost should be evaluated as if it were applied to the most
financially strained district in the land.
The Cedar Rapids Court dangerously ignored the economic realities of the
cost of services requested under the IDEA. A public school district's resources are
finite, and the financial implications of the Cedar Rapids decision could enfeeble
an already underfunded school district that is asked-or ordered-to provide
expensive health-care services to a particular student with extensive needs. While
the IDEA serves a laudable purpose16 and it has, in fact, provided meaningful
access to education for many students with disabilities,17 this note will show that
the Supreme Court incorrectly removed cost as a consideration when interpreting
the statute's related-services provision. Further, this note will show that, as an
economic reality, the cost of requested services must be taken into account,
especially in the context of public schools. However, because the Court is
unlikely to overrule recent statutory interpretation, public school officials are
forced to rely on Congress to fix the problem. This note predicts that Congress
will address the Cedar Rapids decision sometime in the near future, and when it
does, school officials should be ready with some alternatives to the Cedar Rapids
rule.
Part II of this note provides the historical and statutory framework for
understanding the Court's ruling in Cedar Rapids. Part III offers two arguments
that the Court incorrectly chose to ignore the cost of services under the IDEA: one
argument based on traditional principles of statutory interpretation and another
based on the economic realities facing our public schools. Part IV predicts that
15 Id. at32.
16 See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
17 Upon signing the 1997 Amendment to the IDEA, President Clinton made the following
comments:
Since the passage of the IDEA, 90 percent fewer developmentally disabled children are
living in institutions; hundreds of thousands of children with disabilities attend public schools
and regular classrooms; 3 times as many disabled young people are enrolled in colleges and
universities; twice as many young Americans with disabilities in their twenties are in the
American workplace.
Remarks on Signing the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, 33
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 830 (June 4,1997).
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Congress may revisit the IDEA in order to address the Court's error and offers
alternative solutions that public school officials may pursue.
H. WHERE ARE WE 9 UNDERSTANDING THE RULE OF
CEDAR RAPIDS
A. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
In 1975, Congress enacted the Education of the Handicapped Act.18
Amended in 1990, this law became the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA).19 One of the primary purposes of the IDEA is to "ensure that all
children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public
education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet
their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living."20
In order to promote this goal, the IDEA authorizes the disbursement of federal
moneys to those states that agree to provide children with disabilities a free
appropriate public education.21 A free appropriate public education must include
both special-education and "related services."22 Related services, in turn, are
defined as those services that are necessary in order for the child to receive the
benefit of his or her special education program.23 Thus, under the IDEA, a school
district in a participating state must provide a disabled student with related
services as part of her free appropriate public education.
18 Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 611-618 (1964) (current version as
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491o (1994)).
19 Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 901,
104 Stat. 1141, 1142 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (1994)).
20 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). Section 1400(d) further provides that:
The purpose of this chapter are-
(1)(B) to assure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are
protected; and
(1)(C) to assist States, localities, educational service agencies, and Federal agencies to
provide for the education of all children with disabilities;
(2) to assist States in the implementation of a statewide, comprehensive, coordinated,
multidisciplinary, interagency system of early intervention services for infants and toddlers with
disabilities and their families;
(3) to ensure that educators and parents have the necessary tools to improve educational
results for children with disabilities by supporting systemic-change activities; coordinated
research and personnel preparation; coordinated technical assistance, dissemination, and
support; and technology development and media services; and
(4) to assess, and ensure the effectiveness of, efforts to educate children with disabilities.
21 § 1412(a)(1)(A).
22 § 1401(8).
23 § 1401(22).
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Generally, related services include transportation and certain developmental,
corrective, or supportive services.24 More specifically, the IDEA lists several
examples of related services, including speech and language pathology,
audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, social and
counseling services, orientation and mobility services, and early identification and
assessment 25 However, there is one important exemption from the definition of
related services, and this exemption is at the center of the controversy. Under the
IDEA, related services do not include most "medical services."2 6
Because a student's free appropriate public education must be provided by
the public school district at no cost to the student's parents,27 school districts have
a significant interest in which services qualify as medical services and which do
not. If a requested service is determined to be medical, it is not included as a
related service in a student's free appropriate education. Thus, schools are not
required to provide this service. The essential question of the controversy then
becomes: "Which services are medical services and which are not?"
The statute itself provides little guidance, but the courts have formed some
generally accepted rules over the years based on the United States Department of
Education's regulations.28 For example, those services that can be classified as
typical school-health services are not medical services within the meaning of the
IDEA.2 9 On the other hand, those services that must be performed by a licensed
24 Id.
25 Id. However, this list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. See Allan G.
Osborne, Jr., Supreme Court Rules that Schools Must Provide Full-Time Nursing Services for
Medically Fragile Students, 136 EDUc. L. REP. 1, 1 (1999) [hereinafter Osborne, Full-Time
Nursing Services].
26 § 1401(22). While medical services are generally exempted from the definition of
related services, medical services that serve diagnostic or evaluative purposes are not so
exempted. § 1401(22) (emphasis added) ('The term 'related services' means ... supportive
services (including... medical services, except that such medical services shall be for
diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as maybe required to assist a child with a disability to
benefit from special education.). Thus, the general rule is that the IDEA does not require the
states to provide medical services to children with disabilities as part of their free appropriate
public education.
27 § 1401(8)(A).
2 8 See Osborne, Full-Time Nursing Services, supra note 25, at 1 (discussing the general
acceptance of the licensed physician exempted from, and school-health services inclusion to,
the definition of medical services).
29 See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.24(4), 300.24(12) (1999) (giving two separate definitions, one for
"medical services" and one for "related services"). The IDEA regulations define school-health
services as those "services provided by a qualified school nurse or other qualified person."
§ 300.24(12).
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physician are medical services under the IDEA.30 The real interpretive problem
arises when a school district is confronted by services that fall between the two
extremes, something substantially more than typical school-health services but
something that need not be provided by a licensed physician. Specifically, what is
a public school district's obligation under the IDEA to a medically fragile student
who requires the services of a full-time nurse that must tend to him or her on a
purely one-on-one basis?31 Because of the costs implicated by such extensive
nursing services,32 this question was seen as especially significant to all public
school districts.33
B. The Confusion Leading to Cedar Rapids
The Supreme Court first attempted to draw the line between typical school-
health services and medical services in Irving Independent School District v.
Tatro.34 At the time, Amber Tatro was an eight-year-old girl bom with spina
bifida.35 Due to a neurogenic bladder, she was unable to empty her bladder
voluntarily, and as a result she required catheterization every three to four hours
to avoid damaging her kidneys.36 The need for this catheterization created the
controversy. Amber's parents argued that catheterization was a related service for
the purposes of the IDEA,37 and as such, the school district was required to
provide it.38 The school district argued that catheterization was a medical service
and thus not a related service required under the IDEA.39
30 See § 300.24(4) ("Medical services means services provided by a licensed physician to
determine a child's medically related disability that results in the child's need for special
education and related services."). Note, however, that this definition of medical services more
closely describes those medical services that are included under the related-services provision-
that is, medical services that are for diagnostic and evaluation purposes. See supra note 26.
31 Garret F.'s services fall squarely within this gray area. They obviously reach beyond the
practices of a traditional school nurse, yet they do not require a doctor's supervision. Osborne,
Full-Time Nursing Services, supra note 25, at 1-2.
32 The cost of services for just one child can reach tremendous levels. See infra note 134.
33 Osborne, Draw the Line, supra note 11, at 560.
34 468 U.S. 883 (1984).
35 Id. at 885.
36Id.
37 At the time of the controversy, the law was known as the Education of the Handicapped
Act. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
38 Tatro, 468 U.S. at 886.
3 9 Id. at 893.
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The Supreme Court adopted a two-prong analysis to the question of whether
catheterization was a related service under the IDEA.4° First was catheterization
a "supportive service?" 41 Second, was catheterization excluded as a medical
service?42 The Court made quick work of the first prong and found that
catheterization was, in fact, a supportive service.43 The Court then turned to the
second prong of its test and found that catheterization was not a medical service.
44
Relying heavily on United States Department of Education regulations,45 the
Court drew a bright line between school-health services and medical services.46
Under Tatro, medical services are those services that can be performed only by a
licensed physician.47 By negative implication, services that can be provided by
anyone other than a licensed physician are not medical services but school-health
40 See id at 890 (establishing the two questions of the analysis: (1) whether the
catheterization was a "supportive service" that Amber required in order to benefit from her
special education and (2) whether the catheterization was excluded under the medical-services
exemption).
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See id. ("It is clear on this record that, without having [catheterization] services
available during the school day, Amber cannot attend school and thereby 'benefit from special
education.' [Catheterization] services therefore fall squarely within the definition of a
'supportive service.") The Court then made an analogy between catheterization and other
means of access to education, such as ramps and automatic doors. "Services [like
catheterization] that permit a child to remain at school during the day are no less related to the
effort to educate than are services that enable the child to reach, enter, or exit the school." Id. at
891.
44 See id at 895 ("We conclude that provision of [catheterization] to Amber is not subject
to exclusion as a 'medical service' ... and.., that [catheterization] is a 'related service' under
the [IDEA].").
4 5 See id. at 891-93 ("We begin with the regulations of the Department of Education,
which are entitled to deference."). The IDEA empowers the Secretary of Education to issue
regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act. See 20 U.S.C. § 1417(b) (1994); 34
C.F.R. § 300.24(a) (1999) (including school-health services within the definition of related
services); § 300.24(b)(10) (defining school-health services as "services provided by a qualified
school nurse or other qualified person"); § 300.24(b)(4) (defining medical services as those
"services provided by a licensed physician to determine a child's medically related
handicapping condition which results in the child's need for special education and related
services").
46 See Tatro, 468 U.S. at 893 ("By limiting the 'medical services' exclusion to the services
of a physician or hospital ... the Secretary has given a permissible construction to the [related
services] provision:").
47 Id. at 893.
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services.4 8 Thus, in the Court's view, the IDEA exempts from the school district's
financial responsibility only those services that require a licensed physician.
This "licensed physician only" definition of the medical-services exclusion
appears quite on point with respect to a school district's responsibility to fund a
medically fragile student with all-day, one-on-one nursing care. However, the
catheterization services at issue in Tatro were intermittent and noncontinuous. 49
The Court itself, in dictum, posited that the medical-services exclusion was
"designed to spare schools from an obligation to provide a service that might well
prove unduly expensive and beyond the range of their competence." 50 School
districts faced with the higher costs of providing assistance to children with severe
disabilities seized upon this dictum to challenge their financial responsibility for
expensive services that were far more extensive than those at issue in Tatro.51
Confused by the dictum of the high Court, the lower courts were divided.
Some courts applied Tatro as a bright-line test.52 Others applied it as a balancing
test.53
48 The services required by Amber did not require "even the services of a nurse." Id. at
894. Rather, the Court makes special importance out of the fact that "a layperson with minimal
training is qualified to provide catheterization." Id. In fact, the training required to perform
catheterization is less than one hour, Amber's parents, babysitter, and teenage brother have all
been qualified to perform the procedure. Id at 885.
49 See id. (describing the catheterization service as taking only a few minutes to perform
and required only every three to four hours).
50 Id. at 892.
51 See Haekyoung Suh, Note, The Need for Consistency in Interpreting the Related
Services Provision under the Individuals with Disabilities Act, 48 RuTGERS L. REV. 1321,
1325-26 (1996) ("By adding a fiscal consideration, the Court enabled school districts to justify
their refusal to provide assistance to severely disabled children.").
52 See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 106 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1997),
aff'd, 526 U.S. 66 (1999) ("In Tatro, the Supreme Court established a bright-line test: the
services of a physician (other than for diagnostic and evaluation purposes) are subject to the
medical services exclusion, but services that can be provided in the school setting by a nurse or
qualified layperson are not."); Morton Cmty. Unit. Sch. Dist. No. 709 v. J.M., 986 F. Supp.
1112, 1122 (C.D. Ill. 1997) (giving deference to the agency interpretation advocating the
physician/ nonphysician bright-line definition of medical services).
53 See, e.g., Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965, 971 (6th Cir. 1995) ("We
believe it is appropriate to take into account the risk involved and the liability factor of the
school district inherent in providing a service of a medical nature such as is involved in this
controvdrsy."); Fulginiti v. Roxbury Township Pub. Sch., 921 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (D.NJ.
1996) ("[T]he application of the determinative reasoning of all cases which have dealt directly
with factual circumstances similar to the present controversy compels the conclusion of the
court that to require the present Board to assume the responsibility amounts to an undue
burden.'); Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. 1020, 1026 (D. Utah 1992) ("The
court does not read Tatro to stand for the proposition that all health services performed by
someone other than a licensed physician are related services under the Act regardless of the
amount of care, expense, or burden on the school system and, ultimately, on other school
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The courts that found full-time nursing care to be excludable as medical
services primarily focused on the cost of the services and their inherent burden
upon the school districts. 54 In particular, the District Court for the Northern
District of New York forcefully reiterated Tatro's dictum in Detsel v. Board of
Education55 when it found that Congress explicitly excluded medical services to
avoid burdening public schools with the expensive responsibility of providing
health care.56
On the other hand, the courts that found full-time nursing services not to be
medical services, and therefore required as related services under the IDEA,
children"); Bevin H. v. Wright, 666 F. Supp. 71, 76 (W.D. Pa. 1987) ("We simply hold that on
the facts of the present case, the nursing services required are so varied, intensive and costly,
and more in the nature of 'medical services' that they are not properly includable as 'related
services."); Detsel v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (N.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d
587 (2d Cir. 1987) ('In its analysis, the Supreme Court recognized that although meaningful
access to education must be afforded handicapped children, medical services which would
entail great expense are not required."); Ellison v. Bd. of Educ., 597 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1993) (citations omitted) ("Here, the determination that the services were not 'simple
school nursing services' ... but were more akin to 'medical services' which the School District
is not required to furnish, has not been shown to lack a rational basis.").
For a general discussion of the lower court opinions following Tatro, see Leslie A. Collins
& Perry A. Zirkel, To What Extent, IfAny, May Cost Be a Factor in Special Education Cases?,
71 EDUC. L. REP. 11, 14-24 (1992) (discussing the federal courts' treatment of cost in IDEA
cases); Osbome, Draw the Line, supra note 11, at 561-68 (discussing the federal courts'
treatment of medical services with respect to full-time nursing services specifically); Suh, supra
note 51, at 1334-55 (discussing the federal courts' treatment of medical services generally).
54 See Neely, 68 F.3d at 971 ("Since we agree that the services requested by Samantha are
inherently burdensome, we express no opinion about the financial cost of hiring a licensed
practical nurse rather than a nursing assistant The undue burden in this case derives from the
nature of the care involved rather than the salary of the person performing it"); Fulginiti, 921 F.
Supp. at 1325 ("The Township [school district] has met here its burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the care required for [the disabled student] is medical in
nature and that to provide it would be unduly burdensome upon the District"); Shannon M,
787 F. Supp. at 1030 ("The differences between the level of care required in Tatro and the care
required by Shannon are significant"); Bevin H., 666 F. Supp. at 75 ("The services Bevin
requires are far beyond those, and to place that burden on the school district in the guise of
'related services' does not appear to be consistent with the spirit of the Act and the
regulations.); Detsel, 637 F. Supp. at 1027, afid, 820 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1987) ("The extensive,
therapeutic health services sought by the plaintiff on behalf of her daughter more closely
resemble the medical services specifically excluded by [the IDEA]."). Because most of these
courts primarily focused upon the nature and extent of the services requested, one commentator
dubbed this rule the "extent/nature test." Alison Nodvin Barkoff, Comment, Revisiting De Jure
Educational Segregation: Legal Barriers to Attendance for Children with Special Health Care
Needs, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 135, 151-61 (1998).
55 637 F. Supp. 1022 (1986).
5 6 Id. at 1026; see also Osbome, Draw the Line, supra note 11, at 563 ("Congress
specifically excluded medical services from the related services mandate out of concern for
school districts to not be subjected to excessive costs or the burden of providing medical care.').
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applied the "licensed physician only" definition of medical expenses espoused in
Tatro as a bright-line test.57 Thus, due to the Supreme Court's equivocal
definition of medical services in Tatro, the IDEA was still subject to a major
interpretive problem with respect to cost and medical services.
It is clear that schools must provide such students with typical school health services
and are not required to provide medical services that must by law, be performed by a
licensed physician. The controversy exists when the student requires a service that
falls somewhere in between those two extremes, such as a one-on-one nurse during
the entire school day.58
The stage was set for the Supreme Court to revisit its decision in Tatro and
finally settle the issue that it did not then contemplate, a student who required
around-the-clock nursing care.59 The Court granted certiorari to the Eighth Circuit
in order to review that court's decision in Cedar Rapids Community School
District v. Garret F. 60
C. The Bright-Line Test Established by Cedar Rapids
Following logic very similar to Tatro, the Cedar Rapids Court expressly held
that public school districts are required by the IDEA to provide a ventilator-
dependent student all-day nursing care on a one-to-one basis.61 In determining
57 Seesupra note 52.
58 Osborne, Draw the Line, supra note 11, at 568.
5 9 Id. It is important to note that, by amending the IDEA without addressing the medical-
services issue, Congress itself added to the confusion created by the Tatro dictum. See H. Scott
Jacobsen, Shannon M. Continues to Leave Her Controversial Mark on a Utah School District s
Medically Demanding Special Education Students, I J.L. & FAM. STUD. 83, 88 (1999)
("Congress had a chance to settle the debate when it made wholesale changes to IDEA in a
series of 1997 amendments, but none of the changes addressed the portions of IDEA dealing
with 'relevant services' or the 'medical services exclusion.").
60 106 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 523 U.S. 1117 (1998).
61 Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66,79 (1999). The Court endorsed
the lower court's application of the two-prong test in Tatro. Id at 72; Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch.
Dist. v. Garret F., 106 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1997); see also supra notes 40-48 and
accompanying text. The appellate court first found that the services required by Garret were
supportive services since Garret could not attend school unless those services were available
during the school day. Cedar Rapids, 106 F.3d at 825. In determining whether the services were
excludable under the medical-services exemption, the court of appeals reasoned that Tatro had
established a bright-line test. The court found that the services fell outside the definition of
medical services because someone other than a licensed physician could provide them. Id In
affirming the appellate court's application of the Tatro test, the Supreme Court elaborated only
upon the second prong, the first being unchallenged by the school district. Cedar Rapids, 526
U.S. at72.
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whether the services required by Garret were excluded under the medical-services
exemption, the Court emphatically stated that, under the IDEA, the cost of the
services is inconsequential to whether the costs are medical or nonmedical. 62
Thus, the Court rejected the multifactor test offered by the school district,63
finding that each part of the district's test was geared toward the nature and cost
of the services at issue.64
By acknowledging the dictum in Tatro that gave rise to the confusion among
the lower courts,65 the Cedar Rapids Court took an extra precaution to assure that
its holding would be unmistakable. 66 In closing, and as if to preempt any future
challenges to its ruling, the Court proclaimed that "Itihis case is about whether
meaningful access to the public schools will be assured, not the level of education
that a school must finance once access is attained."67 Thus, it is now settled that
public schools are required by the IDEA to provide all-day nursing care to
students who require such services in order to be present in the classroom.68 More
importantly, it is now well settled that the cost of the services requested by a
student with a disability is completely irrelevant as a factor in determining a
public school's responsibility to provide those services under the IDEA.69
62 Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. at 76 ("Continuous services may be more costly and may
require additional school personnel, but they are not thereby more 'medical.").
63 The school district proposed a test under which the Court would look at (1) whether the
care must be provided on a continuous or intermittent basis, (2) whether the services can be
provided by the existing school-health personnel, (3) the cost of the requested services, and (4)
the potential consequences for the school district if the services are not properly performed. Id
at 75.
64 Id. at 76-77.
65 See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
66 526 U.S. at 74 (citations omitted) ("[In Tatro, w]e referenced the likely cost of the
services and the competence of the school staff as justifications for drawing a line between
physician and other services ... but our endorsement of that line was unmistakable"). The
Court seemed to almost sympathize with the school district's concern as it explained that "[t]he
District may have legitimate financial concems, but our role in this dispute is to interpret
existing law" Id at 77.
67 Id at 79 (emphasis added).
68 See Osborne, Full-Time Nursing Services, supra note 25, at 13 ('In the Cedar Rapids
decision the Supreme Court unmistakably endorsed the so-called bright line test... [and]
declared that the only medical or health-related services that are excluded from the IDEA's
related services mandate are those that must be performed by a licensed physician?').
6 9 See id at 13 ("The Court's decision also indicates that school districts may be required
to expend large sums in order to fully implement the IDEA's least restrictive environment
provision."). Under the least-restrictive-means provision, a school district is not only required to
provide a disabled student with a free appropriate public education but also "[t]o the maximum
extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in public or private institutions
or other care facilities, are [to be] educated with children who are not disabled." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(5XA) (1994).
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III. How DID WE GET HERE? WHY THE SUPREME COURT
GOT CEDAR RAPIDS WRONG
In ruling that cost was irrelevant in an IDEA analysis, the Supreme Court
erred in two key respects. First, it abandoned its traditional analytical framework
for statutory interpretation based upon agency regulations.7 0 Second, it ignored
the economic realities facing our public schools and the implications that its
bright-line rule would have on those economic realities.71 This part of the note
deals with each of these errors in turn.
A. Abandoning the Traditional Rules of Statutory Interpretation
It is important to note that, above all, Cedar Rapids is a statutory construction
case.72 The Supreme Court has interpreted the statute to necessarily remove cost
as a consideration in determining which services are medical and which are not 73
However, an examination of the principles of statutory interpretation and the
rationale employed by the Court will reveal that Congress did not remove cost as
a consideration when it drafted the IDEA. In fact, Congress probably intended for
cost to be a factor. This subpart will show that a construction of the IDEA that
gives weight to the cost of the services involved is not only a reasonable
interpretation of legislative intent, but the more likely interpretation as well.
1. The Traditional Analytical Frameworkfor
Deference to Agency Interpretation
The watershed case for statutory interpretation in the modem administrative
state is Chevron, US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.74 In
Chevron, the Supreme Court set out an analysis that is driven by two essential
questions. The first question is "whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue."75 If congressional intent is clear, the analysis is over,
and the clearly expressed intent of Congress is controlling.7 6 On the other hand, if
the statute does not address the question at issue or addresses the question in a
70 See infra Part IIlA.
71 See infra Part III.B.
72 526 U.S. at 77 ("[Ojur role in this dispute is to interpret existing law.').
73 Id. ("Given that § 1401(a)(17) does not employ cost in its definition of 'related services'
or excluded 'medical services,' accepting the District's cost-based standard as the sole test for
determining the scope of the provision would require us to engage in judicial lawmaldng
without any guidance from Congress.").
74 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
75 Id. at 842.
76 Id. at 842-43.
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vague or ambiguous manner, the Court will then look to the relevant
administrative agency's interpretation of the statute.7 7 The sole question before
the Court then is whether or not the agency's interpretation is "a permissible
construction" of the law.78 Even though there is an almost unlimited supply of
other varied tools of statutory construction,7 9 the bulwark of the analysis is
embodied in the two-part test of Chevron.
2. The Majority. Inverting the Traditional Analytical Framework
At the outset of its analysis in Cedar Rapids, the Supreme Court put forward
three primary reasons for its holding: (1) the definition of related services under
the IDEA, (2) its previous decision in Tatro, and (3) the overall statutory scheme
created by the IDEA.80 In order to view these reasons from a Chevron-type
analysis perspective, the first and third reasons for the Court's holding can be
appropriately recharacterized as an inquiry into the clear intent of Congress.81 The
second reason for the Court's holding is properly considered an examination of
the reasonableness of the Department of Education's interpretation of the
statute.82
77 Id. at 843.
78 Id.
79 For instance, it is an established constitutional rule of construction that the Court will
interpret Spending Clause legislation narrowly. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State
is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it. Accordingly, if
Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so
unambiguously.'). Because this rule is of particular relevance to the IDEA, it will be discussed
in more detail below. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
80 Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. at 73-74.
81 This is because, in determining the clear intent of Congress, the Court will first look to
the plain language of the statute, which defines related services under the IDEA. See United
States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) ("There is, of course, no more
persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature
undertook to give expression to its wishes."). However, in determining the plain meaning of the
statute, and in turn Congress's intent, the Court should look at the Act as a whole or as part of
the overall statutory scheme created by the IDEA. See Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650
(1974) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 194 (1856)) (omissions in
original) ("When 'interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in
which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute... and
the objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its various provisions, and give to it such a
construction as will carry into execution the will of the legislature.").
82 This is because the Court reached its decision in Tatro largely on the basis that the
regulations promulgated by the Department of Education were a "reasonable interpretation of
congressional intent." Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 891-93 (1984). The regulations in place during the
dispute in Tatro defined medical services as those "services provided by a licensed physician."
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As previously discussed above,83 the IDEA requires a participating state to
provide a student with a free appropriate public education.84 in order to provide
this free appropriate education, the states must provide special education and
related services.85 The IDEA itself provides a definition for related services.86
This definition explicitly states that medical services are not included in the
related services required by the state as part of the disabled student's free
appropriate public education. 87 Thus, the Court's rule depends squarely on its
construction of the term "medical services."
Curiously, the Cedar Rapids Court began its analysis by noting that "[t]he
scope of the 'medical services' exclusion is not a matter of first impression in this
Court. In Tatro, we concluded that the Secretary of Education had reasonably
determined that the term 'medical services' referred only to services that must be
performed by a physician." 88 Given the fact that Tatro relied primarily on the
administrative regulations,89 this analysis appears to invert the Chevron
framework by placing importance on the reasonableness of the regulations before
determining whether congressional intent was clear.90 Nevertheless, the Court
sought to buttress its reliance on the Department of Education's regulation by
34 C.F.R. § 30024(b)(4) (1999). The current regulations now define medical services as
"services provided by a licensed physician to determine a child's medically related disability
that results in the child's need for special education?' § 300.16(b)(4). Because this definition of
medical services narrows the definition of those medical services that are included in related
services-e.g., medical services for diagnostic or evaluative purposes-it would logically
follow that the current regulations expand the scope of the medical-services exemption.
83 See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
84 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1994).
85 See § 1401(8).
86 Specifically, § 1401(22) of the IDEA provides:
The term "related services" means transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other
supportive services (including speech-language pathology and audiology services,
psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic
recreation, social work services, counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling,
orientation and mobility services and medical services, except that such medical services shall
be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a child with a
disability to benefit from special education, and includes the early identification and assessment
of disabled conditions in children.
87 See id Of course, if the medical services in question are for diagnostic or evaluative
purposes, then they are properly included in the related service required for the free appropriate
education. See id.
8 8 Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66,73-74 (1999).
89 Seesupra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
90 This inversion of the traditional interpretation is a major objection of Justice Thomas's
dissent. Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For a more detailed description
of the dissent's view, see infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
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noting that the administrative interpretation was consistent with what it thought
was a clear statement of Congress's intent.91 In rejecting the School District's
proposed alternative test,92 the Court first noted that the plain language of the
IDEA makes no mention of the cost of services in the definition of either related
services or medical services. 3 The Court makes a rather conclusory statement
that considering cost would "create some tension with the purposes of the
IDEA."94 Thus, according to the Supreme Court, cost cannot be a factor in
determining whether a school district is required to provide a service under the
IDEA. The essential reason for this conclusion is that the Department of
Education's regulations create a reasonable definition of related and medical
services, and the language of the IDEA itself does not speak to cost.95
3. The Dissent: Putting the Reasonableness of
Agency Interpretation in Its Place
An immediate objection to the Court's opinion in Cedar Rapids comes from
Justice Thomas in his dissent.96 In attacking the holding of Cedar Rapids, Justice
Thomas focused his attention on the invalidity of the Tatro ruling as violative of
the traditional rules of statutory construction.97 Specifically, he chastised the
Court in Tatro because it "failed to consider [the] antecedent question [of the
clarity of Congress's intent] before turning to the Department of Education's
regulations implementing IDEA's related services provision."9 8
Thus, the first of Justice Thomas's major objections to the logic of the Cedar
Rapids majority was that the analysis should have been cut short at the question
of legislative intent.99 His position was that the Court had unreasonably defined
91 See id. at 78 ("Congress intended 'to open the door of public education' to all qualified
children" (quoting Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 174, 192 (1981))).
92 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
93 See supra note 73.
94 Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. at 77. The Court supported this statement with a general
statement of the IDEA's purpose as espoused by its previous opinions. See supra note 91.
95 Just as cost analysis is not encouraged by the IDEA's definition of medical and related
services, it is important to note that such an analysis is neither prohibited nor discouraged.
96 Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. at 79-85 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy was the
only other Justice to join in Thomas's dissent
97 See id, at 79 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Because Tatro cannot be squared with the text of
IDEA, the Court should not adhere to it in this case.").
98 Md at 80 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
99 See ia ("The Court need not have looked beyond the text of the IDEA, which expressly
indicates that school districts are not required to provide medical services, except for diagnostic
and evaluation purposes:"); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
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medical services by looking to the provider of those services100 and not to the
nature of the services themselves.10 1 According to Justice Thomas, the provider-
based definition ignores the vernacular of our society. "We do not typically think
that automotive services are limited to those provided by a mechanic.... Rather,
anything done to repair or service the car, no matter who does the work, is
thought to fall into that category."'' 02
Turning to the issue of congressional intent, Justice Thomas then argued that
the narrow physician-based definition of medical services does not suit the
legislative intent behind the statute. "Congress enacted the IDEA to increase the
educational opportunities available to disabled children, not to provide medical
care for them."10 3 While Justice Thomas based most of his objection to the
Court's legislative interpretation on the plain meaning of the medical-services
exemption, there is ample evidence in the legislative record to support the fact
that Congress had never intended to eliminate cost from the analysis under the
IDEA.104 While it is certainly true that Congress intended "to open the school
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter.").
100 Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 889-95 (1984) (defining the term "medical services" as only
those services which must be performed by a physician).
101 See Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. at 81 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ('he primary problem
with Tatro, and the majority's reliance on it today, is that the Court focused on the provider of
the services rather than the services themselves.").
102 Id. at 82. "Similarly, the term 'food service' is not generally thought to be limited to
work performed by a chef." Id
103 Id In fact, prior to the Cedar Rapids decision, some school districts had raised
concerns that the narrow medical-services exception adopted by some of the lower courts
caused the schools to become "mini-hospitals for ... students demanding full-time nursing
care." Jacobsen, supra note 59, at 83 (citing Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon M., 787 F. Supp.
1020, 1029 n.18 (D. Utah 1992)). These concerns were not too far off of the mark In an era of
advancing medical technology, the services that are medical in nature and must be performed
by a licensed physician are diminishing. Consider the following attack on the physician-only
definition of the medical-services definition:
In reality, there are few if any services required by a child as supportive services that must be
provided by a doctor. A doctor might prescribe medication or generally supervise treatment, but
these are not to be excluded medical services. A doctor would only be necessary for medical
procedures that would not be considered supportive services by any definition of the word.
Barkoff, supra note 54, at 196 (footnote omitted). Did Congress really insert the medical-
services exception into § 1401(22) in order to exclude only services like kidney surgery? Under
the Court's definition, would dialysis treatment be a medical or related service? Id. at 196
n.457.
104 During hearings before the Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Youth, and Families of
the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, many of the witnesses expressed their
concerns over the financial burden that providing the services has placed on the public school
system and suggested altemative solutions to the problem. For example, consider the prepared
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house door" to all children with disabilities,105 it did not intend to lower the
educational resources available to other nondisabled children in the process. 0 6
Although the majority in Cedar Rapids proclaims that its "rule that limits the
medical services exemption to physician services is unquestionably
a... generally workable interpretation of the statute," 107 modem vernacular and
the legislative history behind the IDEA make the reasonableness of such a
definition highly questionable.
Even if we could look past the unreasonableness of the physician-only
definition of medical services, Justice Thomas presented another problem with
the definition-a constitutional rule of statutory interpretation. 08 Because the
Court has always viewed Spending Clause legislation, such as the IDEA, as "a
statement of Mr. Jack Lucas, Director of the East San Gabriel Valley Special Education Local
Plan Area:
The Los Angeles County Office of Education... support[s] ... [a] [r]ecognition that primary
responsibility for medical and non-educational related services lies with the state's health and
welfare agencies by requiring that states have in place interagency agreements which address
provision of services, dispute resolution, and methodologies for reimbursement to school
district
Hearings on H.R. 5, the IDEA Improvement Act of 1997, Before the House Subcomm. on Early
Childhood, Youth, & Families of the Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 105th Cong. 12 (1997)
[hereinafter IDEA Hearings]. These interagency agreements found a home in the amended
IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(12)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Consider also the following
statement by Ms. Lous Barela, Director of the Upper Solane County Special Education Local
Plan Area, Fairfield, California: "The IDEA currently mandates a totally open-ended service
delivery system. Unfortunately, there are not unlimited funds." IDEA Hearings, supra, at 77.
10 5 Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982).
10 6 See IDEA Hearings, supra note 104, at 16 (statement of Rep. Michael N. Castle):
We need to be sure that we are helping the children that need to be helped. But we can't break
our school systems in doing that, and we certainly can't prevent or inhibit those children who do
not have disabilities to be as well-educated as they can because of expenditures being allocated
in a too diverse way to the program helping those with disabilities.
See also Gregory F. Corbett, Note, Special Education, Equal Protection and Education
Finance: Does the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Violate a General Student's
Fundamental Right to Education?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 633, 639 (1999) ("Recognizing that state
and local agencies lacked the necessary financial resources, Congress intended to offer free
publicly supported education to special education students without lowering the educational
opportunities available to other students").
107 Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. at 76.
108 Id. at 83-84 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This portion of the dissent relies primarily on
notions of federalism. See Dennis M. Cariello, Note, Federalism for the New Millennium:
Accounting for the Values of Federalism, 26 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1493, 1552-54 (1999)
(discussing the implications of Cedar Rapids on the Supreme Court's federalism
jurisprudence).
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contract between the Government and the recipient of the ftnds,"109 Spending
Clause legislation must be interpreted narrowly so that the recipients of the funds
can adequately assess the deal that they are making.110 Thus, Justice Thomas
bluntly accused the majority of "disregard[ing] the constitutionally mandated
principles of construction applicable to Spending Clause legislation and
blindsid[ing] unwary States with fiscal obligations that they could not have
anticipated." I l l Thus, if there were a reasonable interpretation of the term that
would more adequately explain to the states the true obligations of the IDEA, the
rule of constructing Spending Clause legislation narrowly would prefer that
interpretation.
Justice Thomas offered alternative definitions of medical services from other
areas of federal law.112 The gist of these alternatives is that they adequately depict
medical services in accordance with the general understanding of the word
"nedical"--that is, "'medical' in nature. '1 13
The majority rebutted the "medical in nature" definition with the argument
that such a definition would exclude even the traditional school-nursing services
109 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998). The contract
analogy comes from the fact that the congressional enactment "condition[s] an offer of federal
funding on a promise by the recipient?' Id.
10 See Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. at 84 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[W]e must interpret
Spending Clause legislation narrowly, in order to avoid saddling the States with obligations that
they did not anticipate.").
111 Id. at 85.
112 Id. at 81, 81 n.2. Remarkably, this is not a novel concept in the arena of statutory
interpretation. Interpretation in light of other statutes is based upon the premise that "[s]tatutory
construction ... is a holistic endeavor." United Say. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood
Forrest Ass'ns, 484 U.S. 365,371 (1988) (citations omitted).
A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the
statutory scheme-because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its
meaning clear or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect
that is compatible with the rest of the law.
Id.
113 Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. at 81, 81 nl2 (Thomas, L dissenting); see, ag., 26 U.S.C.
§ 213(d)(1)(A) (1994) ("The term 'medical care' means amounts paid... for the diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any
structure or function of the body."); 38 U.S.C. § 1701(6)(A)(i)-(B)(i) (1994) ("The term
'medical services' includes, in addition to medical examination, treatment and rehabilitative
services ... surgical services, dental services ... optometric and podiatric services, preventative
health services, and... such consultation, professional counseling, training, and mental health
services as are necessary in connection with the treatment"').
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that are routinely provided to nondisabled students.1 14 The majority argues that
this is an anomalous result that Congress could not have intended. 
15
It is difficult to see why such a result would be anomalous, and the majority
does not offer any reasoning to this point. We are left to assume that the Court felt
that if Congress excluded traditional school-health services from the related-
services requirement of the IDEA, then the schools would have carte blanche to
discriminate against students with disabilities in the administration of these
traditional nursing services. But this cannot really be their concern, can it? Would
schools stop providing traditional school-health services simply because they
were no longer required by the IDEA? The mere fact that we call them
"traditional" indicates that the school-health services have been provided for well
before the passage of the Education of the Handicapped Act. If Congress had
indeed excluded school-nursing services from the IDEA's many obligations,
would the schools be free to discriminate against the disabled by rendering these
services only to the nondisabled students? The Court seemed to forget that the
IDEA is not the only federal disability discrimination law. Title Il of the
Americans with Disabilities Act prevents any state entity from discriminating
against a qualified individual because of his or her disability.116
One commentator attacks Justice Thomas's "medical in nature" definition,
claiming that it "does not make sense when compared with other related services
that are provided [under the related services provision of the IDEA]." 1 7 The crux
of this argument is that the IDEA specifically includes services that are medical in
nature, such as physical therapy, in the definition of related services.1 18 Therefore,
a "medical in nature" definition of medical services would rule out those services
specifically provided for in the text of the IDEA. 19
However, the foregoing argument only serves to solidify Justice Thomas's
interpretation of the statute. The commentator overlooks an important aspect of
her argument: those medical services with which they are concerned are in fact
specifically included in the text of the statute. This implicates the rule of
114 Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. at 78 n.10 (majority opinion).
115Id
116 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994) ("[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity."). A public school district is a "public entity" under the Americans with Disabilities Act
See § 12131(1)(B) ("The term 'public entity' means ... any department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local govemment.").
117 Barkoff, supra note 54, at 186.
118 See id at 186-88 ("[Ihe IDEA specifically lists speech pathology, audiology,
physical therapy, and occupational therapy as related services. All of these related services are
medical services.").
119 See id
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construction that cautions against reading a statute so as to render any of its other
provisions superfluous. 120 If Congress truly intended the medical-services
exclusion to cover only those services that must be performed by a licensed
physician, what need was there to include physical therapy in the definition?121 It
is far more likely that Congress anticipated a more familiar understanding of the
term "medical services" and thus saw it necessary to include a list of services that
they feared would be excluded because they fell within such a familiar
understanding. By including specifically listed services that are medical in nature
within the definition of "required related services," Congress meant to exclude
those services that are medical in nature from the medical-services exclusion.122
B. The Financial Implications of the Cedar Rapids Bright-Line Test
Although the Supreme Court decided that cost could not be a factor in
determining the extent of a school district's responsibility under the IDEA,123
school officials were quick to warn that the Court's decision could have severe
financial implications.124 By requiring public schools to provide expensive
services such as all-day nursing care, 125 Cedar Rapids has added another
120 See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759,778 (1988) (plurality opinion by Scalia, J.)
(describing the "cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provision should be construed to
be entirely redundant"). For other Supreme Court cases applying the rule to avoid surplusage,
see Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464,471-72 (1993) (stating that courts "generally avoid construing
one provision in a statute so as to suspend or supersede another provision"); Exxon Corp. v.
Hunt, 475 U.S. 355,369 n.14 (1986); and Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,392 (1979).
121 Assume that the Congress had not included physical therapy in the list of related
services required under the IDEA. Given the Court's physician-only definition of medical
services in Cedar Rapids-which is, arguendo, the correct interpretation of congressional
intent-physical therapy would not be excluded under the medical-service exemption because a
licensed physician is not required to perform it.
122 Justice Thomas seizes upon this logic in order to reinforce his interpretation. "[W]here
Congress decided to require a supportive service-including speech pathology, occupational
therapy, and audiology-that appears 'medical' in nature, it took care to do so explicitly.
Congress specified these services precisely because it recognized that they would otherwise fall
under the broad 'medical services' exclusion." Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526
U.S. 66, 82 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
12 3 See supra Part lI.C.
124 See Mark Walsh, Educators Say Ruling Could Drain Budgets, EDUC. WEEK, Mar. 10,
1999, at 1 ("Some school administrators fear a dramatic increase in special education costs in
the wake of a Supreme Court ruling last week that districts must pay for individual nursing help
needed by students with severe medical disabilities to attend school.").
125 See infra note 134.
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financial burden to an already financially burdened public school system.126 This
subpart will discuss the financial implications of the bright-line test set forth by
the Court.
1. Why Should We Care about Costs?
Before turning to the financial implications of the Cedar Rapids decision, it is
important to discuss precisely why cost should matter. With respect to the IDEA,
and to public schools in particular, the cost of services is relevant for two reasons.
First, because public schools have limited income,127 an examination of its level
of expenses is necessary as an economic reality.128 Second, the IDEA represents a
mandate to the states that, in effect, requires the school districts to fund the free
appropriate public education of children with disabilities before allocating money
to general-education students. 129
The expenses associated with all-day nursing care are particularly
troublesome to school districts that are already facing budgetary crises. 130 Thus,
the cost of such services simply must, as a simple matter of economic fact, be a
consideration in determining responsibility of public schools to provide those
12 6 See Osborne, Full-Tiune Nursing Services, supra note 25, at 13 ("These costs come on
top of what many school districts feel are already over-burdensome expenses associated with
providing special education services.'); see also supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
12 7 See Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Financing Adequate Educational Opportunity, 14 J.L.
& PoL 483, 486 (1998) ("While the importance of education has been acknowledged at the
highest levels of government, elementary and secondary education traditionally ha[ve] been
thought of as a 'local good' and, as such, has been financed through the property tax on the
local level.).
12 8 Tis is an application of what economists refer to as "the law of scarcity," which states
that goods (and services) are scarce because "there are not enough resources to produce all the
goods [and services] that people want to consume.' PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D.
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 8, 746 (14th ed. 1992). To understand how this applies to the public
school setting, imagine a situation where special education and related services would saddle a
public school system with expenses in excess of its budget. It follows that the school district
cannot provide those services. Michael A. Rebell, Executive Director and Counsel, Campaign
for Fiscal Equity, Inc., made this idea clear enough: "[F]iscal resources are limited.... [W]e
can no longer assume that ours is an affluent society with an ever-expanding pie, that can
provide increasing largess to all." Rebell, supra note 12, at 715.
129 This is because there is no coincidental mandate to fund general education. See
Corbett, supra note 106, at 649 (arguing that "the IDEA and state special education statutes
effectively require local school districts to fund special education before they can fund general
education').
130 Financial uncertainty is particularly troublesome in large cities where public education
must compete with other pressing issues of the city (e.g., law enforcement) for municipal tax
dollars. For a general discussion of the 'municipal overburden" concept, see Rebell, supra note
12, at 710-14.
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services.131 Modem public schools draw revenue primarily from local property
taxes.132 Because this method of taxation is highly unpopular, it is quite difficult
for a school district to increase its revenue through an increase in property tax. 133
Without alternative means of increasing the public schools' revenues, the IDEA's
requirements-obligations that must be accepted regardless of expense-could
prove financially crippling to those districts that find themselves in financial
straights even before the obligations are imposed.134
131 See Theresa M. Willard, Economics and the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act: The Influence of Funding Formulas on the Identification and Placement of Disabled
Students, 31 IND. L. REv. 1167, 1178-79 (1998) ("The expense of providing special education
and related services, while encompassing a wide range, can be extensive, and although financial
considerations alone cannot determine a child's special education placement, they must
nonetheless be a factor in any realistic determination of what a school can and should
provide").
132 Robinson, supra note 127, at 486.
133 See id at 512-16 (discussing the high elasticity of the property tax and the "pervasive
resistance" of property owners to an increase in tax). Elasticity is a term used by economists to
describe the effect that movements in one variable (here, property taxes) have on the
movements of another variable (here, residential population). SAMUELSON & NORDHAuS, supra
note 128, at 735; see also Franldin Foer, The Taxes Are Coming! The Taxes Are Coming! New
Hampshire Heads to the Barricades as Treasonous Talk of Income Taxes Fills the Air, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 12, 1999, at 28 (recounting New Hampshire's short flirtation with
income tax as an alternative to property tax); Ellen Lord, School Levy Backers, Foes Square
Off, District "Begging"for Voters' Support, CINCINNATI POST, Feb. 7, 2000, at 6A (depicting
the battle between property tax levy supporters and opponents in the Cincinnati Public School
District); Bill Roberts, Fumbling School Put Idaho in a Bind: Questfor Funds Goes to Capitol,
Court, IDAHO STATESMAN, Feb. 10, 2000, at IA (describing the structural troubles afflicting the
White Pine School District and its scramble for alternative funding methods after the failure of
two school levy increases); Barret Seaman, A Week in the Life of a High School: Monday 7:30
p.m. School Finance: The High Price of Civic Pride, TIME, Oct. 25, 1999, at 82 (describing one
school board's uphill campaign "to sell voters on even higher taxes" despite the fact that it is
situated within a prosperous, but residential, community). Further, public education officials
might soon find that their local support is dwindling even further. As the national population
ages and households with school-age children fall into the minority, the public education
interest group may begin to thin dramatically. See Robinson, supra note 127, at 508-12.
134 The costs required by just one student with severe disabilities can sometimes reach
tremendous levels. See, e.g., Neely v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965 (6th Cir. 1995)
(explaining that the requested services would cost $13,000 per year); Fulginiti v. Roxbury
Township Pub. Sch., 921 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (D.N.J. 1996) (showing that the requested
services would cost $95,000 annually); Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon M., 787 F. Supp. 1020,
1022 (D. Utah 1992) (explaining that services requested would cost $30,000 annually); Ellison
v. Bd. of Educ., 597 N.Y.S.2d 483,485 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (showing that services requested
would cost $25,000-$40,000 annually); see also Charisse Jones, "Special Needs" also among
the Most Expensive, USA TODAY, Apr. 19, 1999, at 15A (describing a school system that
spends roughly $30,000 to $35,000 each year on one disabled child, compared to
approximately $15,000 a year on a nondisabled child).
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Some commentators have even argued that there is an element of unfairness
in a federal statutory scheme that mandates the funding of special education but
contains no comparable mandate for general education.135 This argument rests on
the premise that every dollar allocated by a school district must come from
somewhere: "Since school districts do not have an open checkbook, it stands to
reason that every dollar spent on a continuous service for one child reduces the
amount that can be spent on all children. Thus, the quality of education for all
may be diminished." 136 According to Dr. George Severns, Jr., Superintendent of
Schools for the Dover Area School District in Dover, Pennsylvania, this
siphoning of special-education money from the general-education funds leads the
public to view the IDEA as inherently discriminatory.
Educators have for many years done more with less, but it is becoming increasingly
more difficult to address the genuine education need for children with disabilities. As
local jurisdictions are forced to carry more of the financial burden, children and youth
with disabilities are increasingly being perceived as taking needed educational
resources from other children. For example, funding pressures on school systems
have led to increased class sizes and higher student-to-teacher ratios.
This only further fans the fires of criticism by the taxpayers and shouts of
discrimination against the non-handicapped.1 37
The effect of this unequal mandate is magnified by the fact that some
commentators argue that the IDEA not only requires schools to provide an
education to students with disabilities, but that it requires public schools to help
special-education students maximize their potential. 138
13 5 See Osborne, Full-Time Nursing Services, supra note 25, at 14; Corbett, supra note
106, at 644-50 (arguing that the special education mandate of the IDEA directly reduces the
quality of the general education services provided and is therefore discriminatory).
13 6 Osbome, Full-Time Nursing Services, supra note 25, at 14; see also Jones, supra note
134, at 15A ("Some education officials say school systems already are engaged in a delicate
balancing act, trying to fulfill federal mandates for educating special-needs children while
teaching the rest of their students on strained budgets.").
137 IDEA Hearings, supra note 104, at 110-11 (prepared statement).
138 This argument was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Board of Education v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 204 n26 (1982). However, with the passage of the 1997 amendments,
the potential-maximizing argument has been renewed. See generally Corbett, supra note 106, at
639 n.48 (addressing the 1997 amendments and suggesting that "[t]he purpose of the
IDEA... has been expanded to ensure a quality education for disabled children, not merely
educational opportunity'; Eyer, supra note 11 (arguing that the 1997 reauthorization and
amendment of the IDEA presents a legislative intent that is no longer consistent with Rowley).
While the merits of such an argument are beyond the scope of this note, it is important to point
out that the Cedar Rapids Court cites Rowley with approval. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v.
Garret F., 526 U.S. 66,77-78 (1999).
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Although one commentator who protests the lack of a coincidental mandate
for general education stretches his argument as far as a general accusation of
unconstitutionality of the whole of special-education funding under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,139 this note does not go that
far.140 This note addresses the difficulties that arise at the extremes, where the
level of spending required by one student has a significant effect on the level of
education provided to all. 141 Would the Court maintain its physician-only
definition of "medical services" if it were faced with a situation where the
services required by one child had a truly substantial influence on the level of
education received by all other students within the school district?142
2. Maybe It Will Not Cost That Much
Some commentators believe that it is unlikely that most school districts will
feel any substantial strain as a result of the Court's decision in Cedar Rapids.143
This conclusion is drawn from two underlying propositions. First, the incidence
of students that require the type of services requested by Garret is so small that it
approaches a level of insignificance. 144 This proposition ignores the specific
problem that this note is meant to address--that one student, if he required
expensive services, could financially cripple one school district, if it were already
under a sufficient financial strain. The concern here is the wisdom of an absolute
139 See Corbett, supra note 106 (proposing an Equal Protection challenge to the
constitutionality of the funding scheme created by the IDEA).
140 This note advocates the position that there should be a limit on a school's financial
responsibility under the IDEA, not that the entire law established by Cedar Rapids is invalid.
141 See Osbome, Full-Time Nursing Services, supra note 25, at 14.
142 Such a situation does not have to be hypothetical. In Drew P. v. Clarke County School
District, 877 F.2d 927 (11th Cir. 1989), it was determined that the student at issue could not
receive a satisfactory education unless he was placed in a residential-treatment facility for
autistic children. There were no such facilities in the child's home state of Georgia, so his
parents placed him in a facility in Tokyo, Japan. Later, he was transferred to a newly opened
sister school in Boston. Id. at 929. Although Drew P. was decided well before Cedar Rapids,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the state's duty to provide the services under the IDEA
outweighed the financial burden that these services would impose. Thus, the school district had
to fund Drew's education. See Suh, supra note 51, at 1353-54. There is no doubt that the
services that the school district provided for Drew were costly. Imagine a student like Drew in a
rural school district consisting of one hundred students or an urban school district like those
discussed supra at notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
14 3 See Deborah Rebore & Perry A. Zirkel, The Supreme Court's Latest Special
Education Ruling: A Costly Decisionl 135 EDUc. L. REP. 331,338-41 (1999) (explaining how
Cedar Rapids will have only a slight effect on public schools).
144 Id. at 339. There is some debate over the actual number of such students. Some
scholars argue that it is a number close to 2,000 nationwide. Id. at 338. Others argue that the
number is closer to 17,000. Walsh, supra note 124, at 22.
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rule that completely ignores cost as a factor. Given this narrow focus, the national
aggregate number of children with severe disabilities tells us nothing about how
the high costs of one individual child's free appropriate public education affects
the budget of that student's school district.
Second, the commentators argue that, even if the cost of services for one
child is astronomical, the public school could find financial solace from outside
resources.145 These optimists provide a rather short list of alternative sources of
special-education funds.146 Among the alternatives are interagency agreements
with noneducational public agencies147 and the use of the family's private
insurance.148 Because these alternatives will arguably place a portion of the costs
upon the child's family,149 there is no guarantee that these methods will be
implemented, and the rule of law is still that the cost of services can never be a
consideration under the IDEA.150
While some of these commentators actively address the issue of cost, others
readily dismiss the financial implications,151 and still others almost demonize the
school districts that raise financial concerns over certain applications of the
IDEA.152 Is this really a fair representation of public school administrators'
145 See Rebore & Zirkel, supra note 143, at 339-40 (describing "additional funding
alternatives").
146 See id Alternative sources of funding include interagency agreements with
noneducational public agencies, such as Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance
Program, and the family's private-health insurance. Id.
147 See id For example, a school district could seek funding through Medicaid. Id at 339.
It is important to remember, however, that the use of such interagency agreements may not
result in any cost to the family of the child. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.13(a) (1999). Thus, it is
arguable that these interagency agreements would be unavailable to a school district if they
would result in any loss of noneducational benefits to either the family or the child.
148 Rebore & Zirkel, supra note 143, at 340. Of course, this must be done only with the
parents' consent and cannot result in any cost to the family. See § 300.13(a).
149 See supra notes 147-48.
150 Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garrett F., 526 U.S. 66,79 (1999).
151 See, e.g., Barkoff, supra note 54, at 173-78 (arguing that cost should only be a
relevant factor when choosing between "two equally appropriate methods of providing related
services" and when "determining whether and to what extent a child should be mainstreamed or
should receive residential placement").
152 See Lauri M. Traub, Comment The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: A
Free Appropriate Public Education-At What Cost?, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 663, 684 (1999)
(arguing that the schools' lack of adequate funding creates disincentives for schools to provide
"the optimum educational services to one handicapped child" and, in turn, proposing to
overcome these disincentives by increasing the deference given to parents in determining the
appropriateness of their child's education); see also Barkoff, supra note 54, at 195-96 (arguing
that cost should not be a factor because "it allows schools to foster inappropriate, discriminatory
reasons for excluding children with special health care needs"); Note, Enforcing the Right to an
"Appropriate Education ": The Education forAll Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV.
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motivations? 153 Given that "[s]chool districts today are faced with providing an
infinite number of services with a finite amount of funds,"154 it is not outside the
realm of plausibility to assume that administrators are concerned-and not
unreasonably-about the effect that one student's special education will have on
the general-education budget.155
L. REV. 1103, 1109-10 (1979) ("Even assuming good faith on the part of school officials
dealing with the problems of handicapped children, budgetary constraints will inevitably color
many decisions and restrict the range of alternatives offered in the formulation of individualized
education programs."); Suh, supra note 51, at 1355 (advocating that "a unified judicial
approach is needed to deter school administrations from ignoring the IDEA's mandates").
153 Arguing that the parent and doctor are the more appropriate decisionmakers when
determining whether a severely ill child should or should not attend school, one commentator
points to the fact that the school official 'is not familiar with the conditions and capabilities of
the child." Barkoff, supra note 54, at 198. The problem with this argument is that it can cut both
ways. The school official maynot be familiar with the "conditions and capabilities of the child,"
but he or she is familiar with the "conditions and capabilities" of the school.
The implicit assumption of the critic is that the school official ignores the needs of the
child with a disability and concentrates solely on the school district's pocketbook. However,
that assumption can easily be inverted to say that the parent and the doctor concentrate on the
needs of the individual child and ignore the needs of the other children who look to the school
district's pocket book for their educational services. The validity of both assumptions is highly
questionable, and the preceding analysis is only meant to prove that speculation as to the true
motives of a school administrator concerned about cost provides very little to the debate.
154 Traub, supra note 152, at 684.
155 See Corbett, supra note 106, at 644-50. Further, one could argue that some of these
school administrators have a duty to express their concerns over the general-education budgets
of their school districts. Many state courts have found education to be a fundamental right under
their respective state constitutions. See, e.g., Brigham v. State, 692 A2d 384, 390 (Vt. 1997)
("[I]n Vermont the right to education is so integral to our constitutional form of govemment,
and its guarantees of political and civil rights, that any statutory framework that infringes upon
the equal enjoyment of that right bears a commensurate heavy burden of justification.");
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) ("We hold that in this
State a constitutionally adequate public education is a fundamental right"); DeRolph v. State,
677 N.E2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997) ("IThere is but one system of public education in
Ohio ... created by the state's highest governing document, the Constitution"); Scott v.
Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994) ("[W]e agree... that education is a
fundamental right under the Constitution."); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 (Wis.
1989) ("[W]e do agree... that 'equal opportunity for education' is a fundamental right.'); State
v. Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d 220, 228 (N.D. 1982) ("Article VII of the North Dakota Constitution
deals with education and contains a constitutional mandate to provide a system of schools and
education within the state."); Pauley v. Kelley, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W.Va. 1979) ("Certainly,
the mandatory requirement of 'a thorough and efficient system of free schools,' found in Article
XII, Section 1 of our Constitution, demonstrates that education is a fundamental constitutional
right in this State."); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977) ("We conclude that
without doubt.., in Connecticut, elementary and secondary education is a fundamental
right."); Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (Ariz. 1973) ("We hold that the constitution
does establish education as a fundamental right of pupils between the ages of six and twenty-
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3. How Much Will Compliance with the IDEA Really Cost?
As discussed earlier, the special needs of one child can sometimes reach
astronomical levels.156 Depending on the individual school district's financial
solvency, such services could prove financially devastating to that district.15 7
However, the cost of providing one student with all-day, one-on-one nursing care
cannot be examined in a vacuum. Drawing again upon the law of scarcity,158
costs can be magnified by a reduction of resources or an increase of desired goods
and services. This subpart discusses the trends in educational funding--both
special and general-education funding-that could potentially make some of the
IDEA's related services burdensome on school districts that, but for these trends,
may have been able to shoulder the cost.
One of the most troublesome trends in education funding is the decreasing-
or stagnating-tax base. Property taxes are extremely unpopular, and school
districts constantly fight an uphill battle in convincing local property owners to
accept higher taxes to fund the ever-increasing needs of the local schools. 159 The
uphill battle will soon'become even more difficult as the general population
begins to age.160
In spite of this local funding problem, Congress continues to provide only a
fraction of the special-education funding promised under the IDEA. The IDEA
was passed pursuant to Congress's spending power. Compliance is required only
from states that voluntarily accept federal grants.161 Thus, a state is not required to
comply if it chooses not to accept the money. Due to the voluntary nature of the
one years. The constitution, by its provisions, assures to every child a basic education'); Skeen
v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1939) ("Thus, on balance, we hold that education is a
fundamental right under the state constitution, not only because of its overall importance to the
state but also because of the explicit language used to describe this constitutional mandate.').
15 6 See supra note 134.
157 See John W. Borkowski & Alexander E. Dreier, The 1998-99 Term of the United
States Supreme Court and Its Impact on Public Schools, 138 EDUc. L. REP. 1, 7 (1999)
("Garret F. [v. Cedar Rapids Community School District] imposes heavy obligations on school
districts").
158 See supra note 128.
159 See supra note 133.
160 See Robinson, supra note 127, at 508-09 (predicting a decrease in political support at
the local level due to "a generally aging national population"). Another factor leading to the
decline of local support for educational concerns, including tax levies, is the fact that "for the
first time, households with school-age children constitute a minority of households nationally."
Id. at 509.
161 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1994) (emphasis added) ("A State is eligible for assistance
under this subchapter for a fiscal year if the State demonstrates to the satisfaction of the
Secretary that the State has in effect policies and procedures to ensure that it meets [the
conditions of this subsection]:").
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IDEA as Spending Clause legislation, there is an attractive argument that cost
should not be a factor because the states are not forced to accept the statute's
burdens. 162 This argument overlooks the fact that acceptance of federal IDEA
funds is voluntary in name only. In reality, states are not as free to reject the
money as the conditional nature of the grant would suggest.163
Further, under the IDEA, Congress promised that the federal government
would provide forty percent of the funding needed to cover the expenses that
162 See Eyer, supra note 11, at 635 (arguing that one of the reasons that "funding concerns
should not defeat the recognition of a higher level of substantive rights under the IDEA" is that
the "states are not required to participate in the grant program offered under the IDEA"); Jones,
supra note 134, at 15A ("The state receives money from the federal government to fund
special-ed services.... There's always the argument it's not enough. But under the law, one
excuse that a school cannot give is that there's not enough money."' (quoting Amgenel Wells, a
case advocate with the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program)).
163 In reality, voluntary receipt of federal funds is seldom voluntary. See Edward A.
Zelinsky, The Unsolved Problem of the Unfu nded Man date, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 741,758-59
(1997). Several factors culminate to produce what is referred to as the "flypaper effect:' Id at
758. First, federal grants have sophisticated constituencies who have a direct incentive to apply
political pressure in order to obtain those grants. The majority of taxpayers who do not directly
benefit from the federal grants are unorganized and uninformed with respect to the moneys.
This leaves the local official with very few options in the supposedly voluntary decision
whether to accept conditional funds. Consider the following application of the flypaper effect to
the IDEA specifically:
Nominally the special education act establishes grants which a state is free to receive or
reject... The political reality is that the act has well-organized and active constituencies-
parents of special education children, the providers of special education services including
teachers, administrators and those who train them. A Governor who rejects federal special
education funds thereby acquires the worst kind of political enemies-sincere, energetic, well-
organized interest groups with a morally potent and substantively compelling cause-while not
gaining much (if any) compensating support from the rank-and-file voters, generally unaware of
the special education act and its fiscal implications. On the other hand, by acquiescing to the act
as the politically-compelled status quo, the Governor accepts the open-ended obligation to
provide 'Tree and appropriate" special education, an obligation which the grant funds under the
act only in small part Given the deliberately vague nature of this obligation, its contours are
defined to an important degree by a federal administrative agency sympathetic to, if not
captured by, the special education community. The upshot is that, as a matter of realpolitik the
special education act, while nominally creating an option grant program, in practice fictions as
a partially (and poorly) funded mandate, requiring state decisionmakers to divert general
education revenues which, but for the act and the political dynamics underlying it, might not
have funded special education.
Id. at 759-60 (emphasis in original). In fact, the flypaper effect may explain why none of the
fifty states refuses the "optional" federal grants provided by the IDEA. See Rebecca Weber
Goldman, Comment, A Free Appropriate Education in the Least Restrictive Environment:
Promises Made, Promises Broken by the Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 243, 252 (1994).
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would be required by the Act.164 Nevertheless, the federal government actually
provides less that ten percent nationwide. 165 The 1997 amendments to the IDEA
have provided a new federal funding formula that accounts for each state's
poverty rate,166 but there is still a severe restriction on any yearly increase in
federal funding.167 This lack of federal funding presents a further difficulty. By
requiring the states to assume responsibilities for which the federal government
will assume only limited financial accountability, the IDEA could correctly be
classified as an 'nfimnded mandate" through which Congress passes the costs of
its decisions upon the states.168
In addition to the limited access to local resources and the lack of adequate
funding from Congress,169 supplying all the desired special-education services is
becoming more difficult as overall demand for those services begins to rise.170
Demand for special-education services is rising as "more and more children with
special needs are attending public schools." 171 Some commentators, and even
some members of Congress, have expressed concern that "too many kids are in
164 See 20 U.S.C. § 141 1(a)(2) (1994):
The maximum amount of the grant a State may receive under this section for any fiscal year
is... the number of children with disabilities in the State who are receiving special education
and related services.. multiplied by... 40 percent of the average per-pupil expenditure in
public elementary and secondary schools in the United States.
16 5 See Willard, supra note 131, at 1179 ("Recent data indicates.. .that the Federal
government provides only nine percent of the funding for special education"); Traub, supra
note 152, at 684 ("While the IDEA ideally anticipates the federal government matching forty
percent of a state's funds for special education, the actual figure remains around eight to nine
percent").
16 6 See 20 U.S.C. § 1411(e) (1994).
167 See § 141 l(eX3)(B)(iii) ("[No State's allocation.., shall exceed the sum of... the
amount it received for the preceding fiscal year... and that amount multiplied by the sum of
1.5 percent and the percentage increase in the amount appropriated.").
168 See Zelinsky, supra note 163, at 742 ("The unfunded mandate [is] an attractive device
by which legislators advancing their own political interests opportunistically dispense public
largesse to importuning constituencies while deflecting to officeholders at lower levels of
government the political costs of taxing to pay for that largesse.").
169 Following the law of scarcity analysis, the limited access to local funds and the lack of
funding from the federal government would constitute an increase in the scarcity of resources.
See supra note 128.
170 Thus, students with severe disabilities that require expensive services are not just
competing with general-education students for funds. See supra notes 135-38 and
accompanying text. They are also competing with other special-education students-students
who are demanding more services each day. See infra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
171 Rex R. Schultze, Reading, Writing and Ritalin: The Responsibility of Public School
Districts to Administer Medications to Students, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 793, 794 (1999).
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special education, some of whom simply need a good reading teacher." 172 One
scholar has suggested that this overlabeling may result from teachers' frustration
with certain children.173 Another commentator claims that children are being
incorrectly, but purposely, diagnosed as disabled in order to take advantage of the
beneficial effect of disability as a legal construct.174
Whatever the reasons for the problem of overlabeling, public school districts
seldom challenge claims under the IDEA, preferring to fund special education
over the even higher costs of litigation.175 Consider the following statement by
Representative Michael N. Castle:
[I]t is not the intention of anyone here to make sure that somebody with disabilities
does not get what they deserve. But on the other hand, we have to at some point look
at what is appropriate in terms of costs and levels and whatever it may be, and I am
afraid that this threat of litigation and the due process procedures which are there are
to some degree handicapping that process and weighing it against the district itself;
which is making the decision, particularly those that live in fear of particularly good
attorneys.176
Further, because the IDEA requires the school district to pay the student's legal
fees 'should the student prevail, 177 administrators are even more reluctant to
challenge a claim. 178
172 Stanley S. Herr, Special Education Law and Children with Reading and Other
Disabilities, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 337, 338 (1999); see also H.R. REP. No. 105-95, at 89 (1997)
('Today, the growing problem is over identifying children as disabled when they might not be
truly disabled.').
173 See Schultze, supra note 171, at 795 ("[I]n a school environment, teachers quickly
become frustrated with children who are unable to conform to the rigors of the classroom
environment; therefore, teachers label many of these children 'learning disabled.").
174 See generally Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal
Construct, 50 HASTINGS L.L 241, 296-306 (1999) (discussing "diagnostic dishonesty" where
"legal institutions distort the diagnosis of individual patients," often because a particular, but
rigidly classified, diagnosis is the means to benefits under some legal entitlement scheme).
175 See Corbett, supra note 106, at 648 ("[M]ost local school districts choose to pay for
the increased special education costs rather than challenge [such services] in court because
litigation expenses are even more costly.").
176 IDEA Hearings, supra note 104, at 43-44 (statement of Rep. Michael N. Castle).
177 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (1994) ('In any action or proceeding brought under this
section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to
the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party.").
178 This reluctance to litigate most fringe cases has caused many parents to come forward
with astonishingly absurd claims under the IDEA. Consider the plight of James Fleming,
superintendent of the Capistrano Unified School District:
Fleming has had to battle lawyers who have demanded karate lessons for a kindergartner with
an immune system disorder and school-paid trips to Disneyland for a child who was depressed.
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Finally, there are hidden costs in providing "medical-type" services, such as
the cost of potential liability to the school district for malpractice. 179 By expecting
public schools to provide these medical-type services, the IDEA implicitly raises
concerns about the liability of the district should the services be provided in
manner that could give rise to tort liability.180 This increased exposure to tort
liability should also be considered in determining the overall cost of these
medical-type services.
IV. 'THERE MUST BE SOME KIND OF WAY OUT OF HERE": 181
CONGRESS TO THE RESCUE?
Having established that cost is a relevant part of the economical realities of
our society, we see that cost simply must be a factor in determining whether the
IDEA requires a public school-with limited resources-to provide expensive
health-care services to a severely disabled student. However, the Supreme Court
has declared, in unequivocal terms, that cost is not a relevant factor in the
inquiry.182 Thus, public school officials find themselves caught between a rock
One attorney argued that a child who had seizures as the result of an operation to remove a brain
tumor should be entitled to horseback riding lessons as rehabilitative therapy.
Lisa Gubernick & Michelle Conlin, The Special Education Scandal, FORBES, Feb. 10, 1997, at
66. Obviously, the situations described above represent the extreme. Nevertheless, the costs
involved in fully defending the denial of even the most outlandish claims often force public
schools to concede IDEA requests that would lose on the merits had the school thought it
prudent to fight. Consider again the comments of Rep. Michael N. Castle:
[V]irtually every school district I have talked to is scared to death of litigation. They incur their
own attorneys' fees regardless, and they don't want to do that They don't want to take the risk
of paying the attorneys' fees of the supplicant the plaintiff... plus whatever the other cost may
be, and they find that generally speaking the easier way is to resolve it in some way or another.
And often that resolution ends up being very expensive as well.
1DEA Hearings, supra note 104, at 43-44.
179 The term "medical-type services" is a recognition that common parlance would
consider services like catheterization to be medical, despite the factthat the Court has declared
such services not to be medical, because they can be provided by someone other than a licensed
physician. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
180 See Osborne, Draw the Line, supra note 11, at 570 ("In many situations the student's
medical condition can be life-threatening, especially if proper intervention is not instituted
almost immediately. Expecting a school district to provide nursing services under these
circumstances could also be considered excessively burdensome. It also raises some serious
questions about liability.").
181 J1M HENDpX, All Along the Watchtower, ELECTRic LADYLAND (Arista Records
1968).
182 Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sclh. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 79 (1999) ('This case is
about whether meaningful access to the public schools will be assured, not the level of
education that a school must finance once access is attained").
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and a hard place. Essentially they are trapped between two contradictory rules of
law. The former is a fundamental law of economics.1 83 The latter is the "supreme
law of the land."' 84 The question then becomes: How do we get out of here?
Because Cedar Rapids is a statutory construction case and "considerations of
stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation,"' 185 it is
highly unlikely that the Court will return to the issue of the IDEA's medical-
services exemption. Thus, public school officials must rely on Congress to fix the
problem created by the Court's decision.186 The good news is that this reliance is
not altogether unreasonable. Congress has akeady shown that it is willing to
overturn Supreme Court decisions legislatively by amending the IDEA,187 and
given that the legislative history of the 1997 amendments is replete with concerns
about overburdening the financial resources of the public schools,188 Congress
may amend the IDEA once more.189 If and when Congress returns to the IDEA
183 See supra note 128.
184 "The Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof... shall be the supreme law of the land."U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
185 "Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory
interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative
power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done." Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171-72 (1988).
186 In fact, it appears that the Cedar Rapids Court was asking Congress to address the
issue. " The District may have legitimate financial concerns, but our role in this dispute is to
interpret existing law... [and not] to engage in judicial lawmaking without any guidance from
Congress." Cedar Rapids, 526 U.S. at 77 (emphasis added). From the Court's perspective, it
may have been correctly interpreting an improvident statute, but still the Court decided to
exercise judicial restraint. See Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55,60 (1930) ("Laws enacted with
good intention, when put to the test, frequently, and to the surprise of the law maker himself,
turn out to be mischievous, absurd, or otherwise objectionable. But in such case the remedy lies
with the law making authority, and not with the courts.").
187 Allan G. Osborne, Jr. notes:
In the past Congress has responded to Court decisions by amending the IDEA to effectively
overturn the decisions. Following Smith v. Robinson, [468 U.S. 992 (1984)] .... Congress
passed the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, which provided for the recovery of
attorney's fees by parents who succeeded in an action under the IDEA. In response to Delmuth
v. Muth, [491 U.S. 233 (1989)].... Congress passed the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act of 1990 which abrogated states' eleventh amendment immunity in lawsuits brought
pursuant to the IDEA.
Osborne, Full-Time Nursing Services, supra note 25, at 14 nA5.
188 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text (showing the concern of Congress
regarding the financial constraints on local schools); see also supra notes 121-122 and
accompanying text (explaining what medical services Congress most likely meant to cover by
the IDEA).
189 Of course, if Congress does not revisit the IDEA to address the Court's decision in
Cedar Rapids, public school officials will have a larger problem to face-the acquiescence rule.
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for amendment, school officials would be wise to have some solutions available
for Congress's consideration. The remainder of this part offers a small list of
legislative solutions to the conflict between the physician-only definition of
medical services and the economic realities of public school finance.
A. Defining Medical Services as the Plain Meaning Would Suggest
One solution to the problem would be to expressly define the definition of
'medical services" to more accurately reflect the common understanding of the
term.190 This would most certainly rule out such extensive services like
Garret's-services that serve more of a life support purpose than an education
purpose. Contrary to the concerns of the critics of such a definition, such a
definition would leave services like student-health services and physical therapy
intact.191
However, defining the medical-services exemption by the plain meaning of
the word "medical" would still require the courts to distinguish medical services
from traditional student-health services.192 Arguably, on average, many special-
education students will require more of these health services than the general-
education students, and the school would not be allowed to deny such services
from the special-education students on account of their disability.193 Thus,
distinguishing medical services under the IDEA's exemption from traditional
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 814 (2d ed. 1995) ('If Congress is aware of an authoritative
agency or judicial interpretation of a statute and doesn't amend the statute, Congress is
presumed to 'acquiesce' in the interpretation's correctness."). This principle is most strikingly
demonstrated by the famous case of Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). In Flood, the Court
held that the principles of stare decisis precluded it from revisiting prior decisions where
Congress, fully aware of those decisions, chose not to legislatively overrule the Court.
We continue to be loath, 50 years after Federal Baseball [Club v. National League, 259 U.S.
200 (1922)] and almost two decades after Toolson [v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953)]
to overturn those cases judicially when Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed those
decisions to stand for so long and, far beyond mere inference and implication, has clearly
evinced a desire not to disapprove them legislatively.
Id. at 283-84.
190 For example, Congress could follow Justice Thomas's suggestion and explicitly
borrow the definition of "medical services" from other statutes in the Code. See supra notes
112-13 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text
192 This is because most schools would undoubtedly continue to provide traditional health
services. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
193 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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school-health services194 would probably force schools to fall back on the
"extent/nature test" previously adopted by the lower courts.195
The problem with distinguishing medical services from school-health
services by using the extent and nature of the services requested is that the
extent/nature test 'leads to the result that any expensive, complex, or constant
nursing service will be excluded and the child will not be placed in school." 196
Summarily excluding a child from school solely because the services the child
requests are expensive may run counter to the purposes of the IDEA. 197 The
problem with ignoring costs under the IDEA is that cost is an economic reality
facing many schools across the country.198 Ignoring the fact that some school
districts may be able to afford expensive and extensive nursing services would be
just as reckless as ignoring cost altogether. Thus, given the strong feelings toward
the objectives of the IDEA199 and the power of the special-education lobby,200
defining the medical-services exemption with popular usage of the word
"medical" is not likely to be an attractive compromise to all parties concerned.
B. Implement Spending Caps
Another solution to the problem would be to place spending caps on a school
district's financial responsibility. "[T]he statute could be redrafted, placing
spending caps on individual special education students, specifying certain
194 Distinguishing medical services from school-health services is quite a different
exercise from defining "medical services." Both would be medical according to common usage,
but because the school chooses to provide student-health services--rather than being mandated
to provide them by the IDEA-it will not be able to deny such services to a disabled student on
account of his or her disability. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
195 See generally Barkoff, supra note 54, at 151-60 (discussing the lower courts'
implementation of the extent/nature test). See also supra notes 53-54 (showing how lower
courts have interpreted Tatro).
19 6 Barkoff, supra note 54, at 196 (emphasis added).
197 "The purpose[ ] of this chapter [is] to ensure that all children with disabilities have
available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and
related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and
independent living." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (1994).
198 See supra Part III.B.
199 " would hate to see one child let go of a program. We never know what the potential
of a child is, never." IDEA Hearings, supra note 104, at 70 (statement of Rep. Carolyn N.
McCarthy).
200 See supra note 163.
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disabilities." 201 During the hearings before the House Subcommittee on Early
Childhood, Youth, and Families, one witness actually advocated this position.
20 2
This solution, however, suffers the same infirmities as defining the medical-
services exemption in accordance with common parlance.20 3 Spending caps, like
a broad definition of "medical services," ignore the financial ability of a school to
pay. Once the cost of the services hit a certain point, the child would be denied a
public education. Thus, like the solution described in the previous subpart,
spending caps may not be the best compromise among the special-education
lobby and the public educators.
C. Allow for an Undue-Hardship Defense
If Congress decides that any compromise to the Cedar Rapids rule should
take into account the ability of the school district to pay for related services, an
excellent solution would be to add an undue-hardship defense to the IDEA.
204
This is the middle-of-the-road solution discussed by the Seventh Circuit in
Morton Community Unit School District No. 709 v. J.M 20 5 The court noted that
the IDEA, unlike the Americans with Disabilities Act, does not expressly provide
for such a defense.206 However, it noted that it "can be argued that one is implicit
in the statutory concepts of an 'appropriate' education and 'related' services."
207
201 Corbett, supra note 106, at 667.
202 The proposal was rather innovative, calling for family participation where the services
in question exceeded a certain level.
[The] legislation should allow the community to place a cap on the dollar amount spent on each
student, handicapped or not, and then for any child whose program cost exceeds [the cap] cost
by a designated percentage, the family must be involved in community services, [such as]
work[ing] at the school to help alleviate the cost to the community.
IDEA Hearings, supra note 104, at 101 (statement of Dr. George Sevems, Jr.).
2 03 See supra Part IVA.
2 04 See Corbett, supra note 106, at 667 ("T]he statute could be redrafted... prohibiting
special education programs from burdening general education.").
205 152 F.3d 583 (1998).
2 06 Id at 586. The undue-burden defense can be found in the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994):
[T]he term "discriminate" includes.., not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.
207 Morton, 152 F.3d at 586.
Perhaps at some point the expense of keeping a disabled child alive during the school day is so
disproportionate to any plausible educational objective for the child that the expense should not
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It is important to note that Morton did not actually endorse the imposition of
the undue-hardship test.208 The court held that, even if it were to recognize an
undue hardship as a defense to the IDEA, "[t]he school district has made no effort
to show that the expense of a full-time nurse for [the student at issue] would be
undue in relation to the other calls on the district's budget."20 9 Further, the court
went on to show that costs of the services at issue did not, in fact, constitute an
undue hardship.210 The relevance behind this is that, as the Morton court shows,
an undue-hardship defense would not systematically eliminate services from
students' free appropriate public education simply because those services are
expensive. The cost of services would be viewed in relation to the financial
resources of the school district in order to determine whether or not they were
unduly burdensome upon the district.211
This solution would adequately address the problems created by that
decision. At the same time, the undue-hardship defense would allow Congress to
leave the Court's interpretation of medical services under the IDEA untouched.
Because the undue-hardship defense would neither systematically deny services
based on cost nor completely ignore costs in determining whether the services are
required under the IDEA, this appears to be the ultimate compromise between the
special-education lobby and public educators.
D. Pay Up
Finally, Congress could simply pay up and provide the money it supposedly
promises under the IDEA.2 12 "mIhe statute could be rewritten such that the
federal government must provide more than seven percent of the funding for
be considered a component of an appropriate education for a severely disabled child or a service
reasonably related to such an education. So at least the cases that we have cited suggest.
lId
208 Id ("We need not take sides.").
209 Id
210 See id at 586-87 (discussing the actual costs incurred by the district and its available
sources of funds and finding, based on the evidence presented, that the requested services did
not constitute an undue burden).
211 Section 12111(10)(A) defines "undue hardship" as "an action requiring significant
difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B).' 42
U.S.C. § 1211 1(10)(A) (1994). Among the factors listed in subparagraph (B) are "the overall
financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable
accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility;, the effect on expenses and
resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility'
and "the overall financial resources of the covered entity, the overall size of the business of a
covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; [and] the number, type, and location
of its facilities." § 1211 l(10)(B)(ii),(iii).
212 See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
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special education.'2 1 3 This would most certainly be in line with the views
expressed in the legislative history.214
This solution would provide the most pragmatic results. Providing the full
forty percent promised by the IDEA will not address the problem of ignoring cost
or services under the IDEA. However, it would provide the school with more
funds to lighten the burden imposed by the IDEA and its narrow medical-services
exemption. Further, by providing the forty percent promised, Congress would, at
least in part, assuage the unfunded-mandate problem inherent in the IDEA.215
This, in turn, would support the argument that because federal moneys are
conditioned upon compliance, cost may not be a defense to the IDEA's
requirements.2 16 As a compromise between the special-education lobby and
public educators, this solution requires an empirical inquiry well beyond the
scope of this note.
V. CONCLUSION
In Cedar Rapids Community School District v. Garret F.,217 the Supreme
Court ruled that cost is entirely irrelevant in determining which services are
required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 18 In arriving at its
conclusion, the Court disregarded its traditional principles of statutory
interpretation. 219 The result is a rule that will have severe financial implications
for American public schools 20 However, not all hope is lost. Congress may
213 Corbett, supra note 106, at 667.
2 14 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. The most straightforvard comments come
from Rep. Carolyn N. McCarthy-
Now, obviously when learning disabled programs were put into effect, the Federal
Government, at that time, I think promised up to 40 percent, and I think last year they raised it to
8 percent.
... We haven't done our jobs here on the Federal level as far as giving the States their
money. We promised them and we didn't. We did a tenble job from what I can read in the
history. If anything we should be supporting the States more.
IDEA Hearings, supra note 104, at 69-70.
2 15 Seesupra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
2 16 See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
217 526 U.S. 66 (1999).
2 18 See supra note 11.
2 19 See supra Part lI.A.
220 See supra Part JU.B.
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revisit the IDEA at some point in the near future.221 When it does, public school
officials should be ready with recommendations for an alternative rule.222
221 See supra notes 186-87, 189.
22 2 See supra Part.IV.
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